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Albert Schweitzer's ethics of reverence for life is more 
complex and interesting than fIrst appears. It contains 
themes relevant to contemporary environmental ethics, 
including a virtue-ethics approach that emphasizes 
personal responsibility and tolerance, empathy for living 
organisms, and the fundamental unity of life. Not 
surprising, then, Schweitzer has recently been 
acknowledged for pioneering a biocentric (life-
centered) ethical theory.l 
At the same time, Schweitzer's ethic has four 
unpalatable features: pantheism, anthropomorphism, 
excessive subjectivity, and guiltmongering. I trace these 
features to the metaphysical framework in which 
Schweitzer develops his ideal of reverence for life. I 
also show how the framework can be set aside while 
retaining much of the spirit and substance of his ethics. 
My aim is not to defend his ethics, but to interpret it 
and show its contemporary relevance. 
I. Unity of Life (without Pantheism) 
Theories of environmental ethics differ according to 
their conceptions of what things have inherent worth, 
that is, value in themselves and independently ofhuman 
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desires and appraisals.2 According to human-centered 
(anthropocentric) ethics, only humans have inherent 
worth. Other natural objects have value only because 
humans value them, whether instrumentally or 
intrinsically. Things have instrumental value when 
they are useful to humans. For example, drinkable 
water, breathable air, and natural medicines have 
instrumental value because they contribute to the 
further good of health. Things have intrinsic value 
when they are pleasing because of their aesthetic or 
symbolic properties, as when we value wilderness 
areas and bald eagles because of their beauty and 
community significance. 
Non-human-centered ethics locates inherent worth 
in natural things in addition to humans. In particular, 
biocentric ethics locates inherent worth in living things. 
Although Schweitzer did not explicitly use the distinc-
tion between inherent worth versus intrinsic value, it is 
clear he defended a biocentric ethics that locates 
inherent value in all living things: all life is "sacred" 
and "something possessing value in itself."(C 57)3 
Theories of environmental ethics also differ 
according to whether they are individualistic or holistic 
in approach. Thus, bioeentric theories are individualistic 
when they locate inherent worth in particular organisms. 
They are holistic when they locate inherent worth in 
communities of life (ecosystems), in types of life 
(species), or in the environment as a whole. Schweitzer 
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bridges the dichotomy between individualistic and 
holistic bioethics. He insists that each living organism 
has inherent worth, yet at the same time his primary 
theme is the unity of life. This moral and spiritual unity 
is ultimately unfathomable, which is why he calls his 
theory ethical mysticism. This is an "active mysticism" 
that inspires commitments to further life, by contrast 
with "passive mysticism" centered on emotional 
experiences of identity with God or nature.(C 79) 
Schweitzer renounced metaphysics in the sense of 
a search for an ultimate purpose of the universe that 
gives meaning to humanity.(C 73) The meaning of our 
lives is created through personal commitments, not 
discovered through cosmic speculation. Nevertheless, 
Schweitzer did hold a metaphysical theory in the sense 
of a view of ultimate reality, and that theory forms the 
framework in which he develops his theme of life's 
unity. He maintained a faith in a universal, infinite, and 
creative Will-to-live.(C 79) Much of the time this faith 
remained in the background, but it surfaced periodically, 
as in this passage: "Reverence for life means to be in 
the grasp of the infinite, inexplicable, forward-urging 
Will in which all Being is grounded."(C 283)4 
Schweitzer was influenced by Arthur Schopenhauer's 
voluntarist metaphysics according to which ultimate 
reality is will. "Behind all phenomena" there is will-to-
live, and each organism constitutes part of that will-a 
will to both survive and to develop according to its 
natural tendencies.(C 308, 282) Unlike Schopenhauer, 
Schweitzer was deeply religious, though his religious 
convictions were highly unorthodox. They hovered 
somewhere near pantheism but were closer to 
biotheism-the view that God is manifested in and 
constituted by all life.5 By the time he wrote The 
Philosophy of Civilization Schweitzer was most likely 
an agnostic concerning supernatural beings (God, 
angels, souls), even though he continued to use 
conventional religious language when speaking as a 
minister and theologian. The divine is immanent in 
nature rather than transcendent to it: "The Essence of 
Being, the Absolute, the Spirit of the Universe, and all 
similar expressions denote nothing actual. .. , The only . 
reality is the Being which manifests itself in 
phenomena."(C 304) 
Schweitzer's metaphysics has some interest. It 
shares a kinship with the worldviews of Spinoza, 
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Native American religions. 
Perhaps its greatest value lies in bridging Christian 
orthodoxy and naturalistic worldviews. Even so, I wish 
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to set the metaphysics aside, at least the part of it which 
suggests there is a cosmic and semi-deified Will-to-live 
that can be said to act creatively in the universe. What 
then remains of the theme of life's moral unity? 
Abandoning Schweitzer's metaphysics need not 
mean rejecting his ethics.6 I offer three preliminary 
observations. First, Schweitzer is the first to remind us 
that the core of a moral outlook can survive intact after 
being freed from the worldview in which it was first 
developed. In The Quest of the Historical Jesus he 
argues that Jesus held a false eschatology which 
anticipated the end of the world during his lifetime. That 
eschatology led to some unjustified value judgments, 
including a pessimistic renunciation of human society 
as a mere overture to the approaching kingdom of God. 
Nevertheless, Schweitzer embraces Jesus as a moral 
paragon whose ideal of love can be transplanted from 
the metaphysics in which it was initially formulated. 
I suggest the same is true of Schweitzer's ideal of 
reverence for life. 
Second, Schweitzer insists that ethics cannot be 
inferred from metaphysics. In particular, the ideal of 
reverence for life cannot be derived from observing 
nature's spectacle ofkilling. Schweitzer prides himself 
on being "absolutely skeptical" about cosmic purposes 
while maintaining an optimistic and life-affirming 
attitude.(C 76) As I have suggested, he is not as 
metaphysically skeptical as he claims, since he 
continues to assume there is a unified and universal 
Will-to-live manifested in all life. Nevertheless, setting 
aside his metaphysics is consistent with the spirit ofhis 
largely empirical-oriented "natural ethic."(L 235) 
Third, Schweitzer's metaphysics distorts some of 
his most important ideas. For example, in the next 
section I show how his central argument for the ideal 
of reverence for life is cogent only when freed from its 
metaphysical moorings. Even the central theme of the 
unity of life is better appreciated without relying on 
metaphysical speculations. When Schweitzer urged in 
his sermons, "Wherever you see life-that is yourself!," 
he evoked responses that were not dependent on his 
parishioners being pantheists.(R 115) 
We might understand the unity-of-life theme as 
drawing together a rich variety of familiar experiences 
and facts, including the following. 
1. Compassion is a natural response to the suffering 
of other people and animals, a response which 
Schweitzer felt in extraordinary degrees from 
childhood on.7 He was ahead of his time in calling 
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for humane treatment of animals in medical 
experiments and food production.(C 318) 
2. We have benefited in many ways from animals, 
including the suffering inflicted on animals in 
medical experiments. Because of this "a new and 
special relation of solidarity has been established 
between them and uS."(C 318) 
3. Caring in the animal world is often strikingly 
analogous to human caring, and both have a 
biological origin. Just as humans care for their 
children, many species of animals care for their 
offspring and even for animals outside their kin-
ship groups. In citing such examples Schweitzer 
anticipates the insights of sociobiologists about 
the genetic basis for human and nonhuman 
caring.(L 237-9, C 224-6) 
4. With many individual animals we can enter into 
reciprocal caring relationships, indeed "friendship 
with animals."g 
5. Plants, animals, and humans interact in complex 
chains of interdependency. We are united with 
nature in that our very survival depends on those 
interdependencies being sustained.(L 237) 
6. We experience moments of awe in which we 
marvel at the sheer existence of life and the infinite 
diversity of living creatures.(R 114-5) 
7. We also experience moments of humility when 
we understand that humanity is but one ofmillions 
of fragile life forms and not the final goal of the 
universe.(L 226) 
8. The competition andkilling defining the food chain 
are not the only significant aspects of nature. 
Equally noteworthy is the cooperation and 
tolerance which have evolved as part of the shared 
struggle to survive.(C 260) 
The moral implications of these experiences need 
to be sorted out and considered separately. Nevertheless, 
they have a cumulative impact in moving us toward a 
sense of oneness with nature of a sort aptly conveyed 
in the phrase "reverence for life"-reverence for life as 
a whole, as well as for particular organisms. 
II. Empathy with Life 
(without Anthropomorphism) 
An adequate ethical theory, according to Schweitzer, 
meets several general criteria. 
1. It provides a unifying perspective on moral 
values.(C 105) 
Between the Species 
2. It focuses on self-perfection, where complete self-
perfection implies bringing our lives into a positive 
relationship with the universe and with life as a 
whole.(C 57, 296) 
3. It is optimistic in the sense of evoking positive 
committnents on behalf of civilization, which 
consists in progress ofall kinds, and itevokes steady 
and enthusiastic committnent by tapping into our 
most basic sources of motivation.(C xiii, 107) 
4. It avoids metaphysical assumptions about the 
ultimate purposes of the universe.(C 76) 
Surveying the history of ethics, Schweitzer argues 
that the ethic of reverence for life meets these criteria 
better than competing theories. His arguments, 
however, turn substantially on personal factors about 
how the ideal of reverence for life brings self-
fulfillment through service to others.(C 255) 
Alternative moral theories generate greater motivation 
and self-fulfillment for some individuals, and from a 
modern pluralistic point of view it is misguided to call 
for "a single ideal of civilized man."(C 47) In any case, 
something more is needed to justify reverence for life 
than the four general criteria. 
The "something more" is Schweitzer's famous will-
to-live argument. (C 308-311, 0155-158, L 227-229). 
The argument is easily ridiculed because it seems to 
depend on attributing human features to all living things. 
Anthropomorphic attributions permeate Schweitzer's 
writings, such as when he says that all organisms suffer,9 
that a beetle is capable of "rejoicing in the sun like 
you,"(R 115) and that each organism "strives" to achieve 
its highest perfection.(C 282) But anthropomorphism 
is especially prominent in the will-to-live argument., and 
it makes the argument seem utterly naive, as the 
following summary indicates. 
I am a will-to-live, with desires for self-preservation, 
self-perfection, pleasure, happiness, and avoiding pain. 
All other organisms have these same desires, feelings, 
and aspirations: "As in my own will-to-live there is a 
longing for.... pleasure, with dread of annihilation and 
wider life and for.... pain; so is it also in the will-to-
live all around me."(C 309) Therefore, since I value 
my life I must (in consistency) value all other life, "for 
I shall know that it longs for fulness and development 
as deeply as I do myself."(L 230) 
The obvious rejoinder is that most organisms do not 
have desires like mine, whether for gaining pleasure 
and avoiding pain or for self-survival and self-
perfection. Pleasure and pain are conscious states, and 
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plants and protozoa lack the neurological structures for 
having or desiring conscious states. Moreover, desiring 
self-survival and self-perfection implies having a 
conception of oneself, a self-consciousness, that plants 
and most animals lack. Even ascribing a will-to-live to 
plants and lower animals seems anthropomorphic 
insofar as a "will," at least in one literal sense, implies 
conscious intentions, desires, and beliefs. 
How can we explain Schweitzer's seemingly naive 
anthropomorphism? As a physician and scientist, he was 
well aware that plants and lower animals lack the 
requisite neurological structures for consciousness. 
Clearly he was influenced by Goethe and other 
romantics who in their poetry personified nature, but 
how could a well-trained scientist be so apparently 
credulous in responding to that influence?lO 
Much of the explanation is his metaphysics. If each 
organism is literally part of a universal Will-to-live, and 
if the basic features of that universal will are uniform 
in all living organisms, then anthropomorphism is 
virtually inevitable, especially if we begin by rel1ecting 
on our own will-to-live. This tendency to anthro-
pomorphize, however, is blocked once we set aside the 
metaphysics. There is little temptation to make literal 
ascriptions of human properties to algae and protozoa 
if they are no longer regarded as instantiations of a 
universal and personified will to live. 
Another part of the explanation, however, is that 
Schweitzer may not have been as naively anthro-
pomorphic as first appears. ll We can construe his 
anthropomorphic images as metaphors designed to 
evoke empathy with other life, rather than as literal 
ascriptions of human features to nonhuman organisms. 
Whether or not this was his primary intention, it invites 
a more serious examination of the will-to-live 
argument. Let us strip away the anthropomorphic 
images, retaining only the idea of a will-to-live 
understood as a literal reference to genetically-driven 
instincts to survive and develop. The following 
argument emerges.(O 155-8) 
1. Will-to-Live Thesis: "I am life that wills to live in 
the midst of life that wills to live." 
2. Definition: My will to live is defined by instinctive 
tendencies to survive and develop. 
3. Self-Affinnation Thesis: When I am healthy and 
sincere towards myself, I feel reverence for my 
will to live: I affmn my will-to-live, as defined in 
(2), as having inherent worth, and I devote myself 
to its expression, preservation and development. 
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4. Analogy: All other organisms have similar 
tendencies to survive and develop. 
5. Empathy Thesis: I experience empathy with other 
life as I reflect honestly, dwelling on its similarity 
to my life. 
6. Life-Afftrmation Thesis: My empathy generates 
sympathy, caring, and a "compulsion" (a strong 
desire and felt obligation) to approach other life 
with the same reverence I feel for my life. 
7. Conclusion: Reverence for life is a fundamental 
virtue that consists in "preserving life, promoting 
life, developing all life that is capable of 
development to its highest possible value" and in 
not "destroying life, injuring life, repressing life 
that is capable of development." 
This argument is phenomenological or experience-
based. It proceeds by reflecting on our experiences of 
our instincts to survive and develop, our affmnation of 
our lives inherent in those instincts, and our experience 
and knowledge of those same instincts in other life. 
Notice also that the conclusion is a statement about a 
virtue, not a rule of conduct. To be sure, reverence for 
life is a mandatory virtue, a virtue that we ought to 
cultivate and that embodies obligations. But it is a 
character trdit, a desirable attitude and disposition, rather 
than a principle of action per se. 
This interpretation captures Schweitzer's insistence 
that ethics is a product of reasoning that reveals how 
our attitudes toward all life should be "of a piece with" 
attitudes toward ourselves.(L 230) It also captures his 
conviction that reverence for life is a natural 
expression of our will-to-live: "I can do nothing but 
hold to the fact that the will-to-live in me manifests 
itself as will-to-live which desires to become one with 
other will-to-live."(C 312). Our inclination to contribute 
to other living things expresses our desires for self-
fulfillment. We achieve "self-perfection through self-
devotion": self-fulfillment through exercising and 
expanding our natural capacities for empathy and 
sympathy for other life.(C 255) 
The crux of the argument is the experience of 
empathy of a kind that inspires sympathetic concern 
for other life. This appeal does not make Schweitzer's 
ethics human-centered. Empathy is a response to other 
life as like us, but just as much a response that we are 
like other life, at the fundamental level of shared dri ves 
to survive and develop. 
Schweitzer does not use the word "empathy" as 
frequently as "sympathy," but he does use various 
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phrases to convey the idea. Reverence for other life 
begins when one experiences that life "in" one's own 
life, "feeling as one's own all the circumstances and all 
the aspirations of the will-to-live."(O 157, C 311) 
Empathy does not imply sharing the feelings and desires 
of the organisms we empathize with, and hence it is not 
based on anthropomorphic ascriptions of feelings and 
desires to all life. It is also broader than compassion, 
which is a sympathetic response to the suffering of 
sentient creatures.(C 311) Empathy means identifying 
with other life, at least at the level of shared tendencies 
to survive and develop within the range of possibilities 
made possible by circumstances and genetic inheritance. 
But the identification must involve a degree of concern 
sufficient to develop naturally into sympathy and caring. 
Is the will-to-live argument sound? Not in the sense 
of providing a knock-down proof. Nevertheless, the 
argument is far from being silly. It is provocative and 
relevant to contemporary environmental ethics. Here 
are some of the problems which need to be confronted 
in assessing the argument. 
Contrary to premise (5), not all of us experience 
empathy for all life forms. What then? Schweitzer can 
only try to generate, intensify, and expand empathy. One 
way is by asking us to reflect further on similarities 
between our will-to-live and other organisms' instincts 
to survive and develop. Another way is to urge us to 
recall occasions when we felt moments of union and 
kinship with nature (of the sort listed earlier). Still 
another way is to use anthropomorphic metaphors to 
evoke empathy and sympathy. 
Even if we do come to the point where we 
experience a "compulsion" to feel empathy with all 
other life, as premise (6) suggests, perhaps that 
compulsion should be resisted. Desires and feelings of 
obligations can be misguided. Just because they are 
natural does not mean they are justified. Thus, even if 
(6) states a fact, there is a contestable move to the value-
statement in (7) about a worthy ideal of character. The 
move involves an "is-ought" gap: If there is a 
compulsion to feel reverence for life, how does that 
establish that we ought to cultivate it, or that it is the 
most fundamental virtue? Still, if we do come naturally 
to experience a strong desire to revere life, this 
experience is certainly relevant to the conclusion. It 
bears on matters of personal identity, integrity, and 
fidelity to our experiences of unity with life. 
Questions about personal identity retUl11 us to 
premises (1) and (2): Does our will to survive and 
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develop define us in some basic way? Schweitzer 
insists the most "elemental" (basic, immediate) 
discovery is of ourselves and other life as sharing a will-
to-live whose essence is to survive and develop. He 
chastises Descartes for beginning with an empty 
abstraction, "I think, therefore I am." "To think means 
to think something," and the most primordial thought 
to emerge from introspection is that I am a will to live 
amidst other wills to live.(O 156) Yet, introspection can 
only uncover what our conceptual schemas predispose 
us to uncover. Descartes' conceptual framework 
predisposed him to 'discover' a thinking substance, 
whereas Schweitzer's metaphysical framework 
predisposed him to discern a will to live among other 
such wills. At the same time, perhaps premises (1) and 
(2) will survive in some form within a contemporary 
sociobiological framework that does not rely on 
Schweitzer's metaphysics. 
Is premise (3) true? Does sincerity toward ourselves 
lead us to affirm our will-to-live at the "elemental" level 
indicated? "Sincerity" implies honesty with oneself, but 
it also implies being "true to oneself' and maintaining 
"fidelity with oneself."(C 78, 282; L 230) It implies a 
fundamental self-affirmation by bringing to conscious-
ness an instinctive desire to survive and develop.(O 157) 
The deepest level of self-affirmation does seem to be 
an outgrowth of instinctive will to live. This bedrock 
affmnation is not based on specific features ofourselves, 
nor even our general capacities as humans. If it is as 
primordial as Schweitzer suggests then it gives some 
cogency to the will-to-live argument. 
The will-to-live argument omits, however, that we 
value ourselves and other humans for additional reasons 
beyond our instinctive will-to-live. We affmn ourselves 
at many levels, including at the level of specific 
characteristics (our interests, accomplishments, 
relationships, virtues, etc.) and generic properties (our 
general human capacities). In these respects we are not 
comparable to all other life, and our full worth turns on 
things beyond the instinctive drives we share with all 
life. That is relevant in understanding how to act when 
confronted with conflicts between our lives and others, 
or between killing one life to save another, topics to 
which I turn next. 
In short, there are difficulties with the will-to-live 
argument, but nevertheless the argument carries some 
force, especially when its appeal to empathy is 
combined with the unity-of-life experiences mentioned 
earlier. It may tum out that we do discover within us an 
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empathetic desire to identify with and care for other 
life, a desire that is as natural ("healthy," "sincere") and 
deeply-rooted ("elemental") as our self-affirmation. If 
so, it seems likely that empathy will be a key ingredient 
in any non-human-centered ethicsY 
III. Moral Guidance (versus Arbitrariness) 
In saying that all life deserves reverence, Schweitzer 
did not claim that all life has equal value, and he was 
usually careful not to assert moral equality among all 
living things (whatever that would mean). At the same 
time, he consistently refused to rank the value of 
different species and types of life. The ethical person, 
he tells us, "does not ask how far this or that life deserves 
one's sympathy as being valuable, nor, beyond that, 
whether and to what degree it is capable of feeling. Life 
as such is sacred to him."(C 310) Yet, as Schweitzer 
also emphasizes, we cannot live outside nature's cycle 
of killing. Even to breathe or to take a walk is to kill 
micro-organisms, and often we must save one life by 
destroying others. What guidance, then, does he offer 
about killing versus preserving life? 
Schweitzer tells us we must kill only when 
"necessary" and that determining when killing is 
necessary involves "subjective" and "arbitrary" 
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decisions.(O 236, L 233) As it stands, the idea of 
arbitrary decisions about killing is a dead end (no pun 
intended). What led to this impasse? 
Schweitzer offers two reasons against ranking life 
forms, each of which is interesting but incon-
clusive.(O 235) First, ranking encourages abuses and 
callousness, such as dismissing some fonus of life, 
whelher "primitive peoples" or endangered species, as 
being worthless and destroyable at whim. This is a 
genuine problem, but it can be resolved by exercising 
good moral judgment based on sound reasoning and 
caring. Second, he insists that rankings cannot be 
justified in tenus of differential roles of life fonus in 
the universe, since we lack knowledge of any such 
cosmic roles. Perhaps, however, we mightjustify at least 
rough guidelines about the differential treaunent of life 
forms by reapplying Schweitzer's own appeals to 
empathy, as I will suggest in a moment. 
I believe that the real reason why Schweitzer refuses 
to rank life forms or offer priority rules is his 
metaphysics. If each organism is a sacred part of a 
universal and semi-deified Will-to-live, then it would 
seem blasphemous to grade or rank them, either as 
individuals or as members of species. It would also 
follow that killing any life is sacrilegious. Ifwe set aside 
the metaphysics, are there perhaps other aspects of 
Schweitzer's ethics that provide some guidance about 
when killing is justified? 
Schweitzer boldly set forth a virtue (or character) 
ethics before it became fashionable to do so. Now, 
according to long-standing objections, virtue ethics as 
too vague and provides insufficient guidance; it 
encourages subjectivity and even arbitrariness. 
Aristotelians offer a two-fold reply. First, the virtues 
do provide significant guidance, especially when they 
are carefully sorted out and applied. Aristotle sorted 
the virtues according to particular areas of conduct and 
feeling where they function as a reasonable guide 
between excess and defect. Contemporary virtue 
ethicists have developed more subtle approaches to 
clarifying the meaning and application of specific 
virtues. Second, while rules playa role in moral conduct, 
they are not enough. The essential factor in difficult 
situations is good judgment-practical wisdom. Good 
judgment is a product of proper upbringing, breadth of 
experience, and nuanced moral sensitivity, rather than 
a mechanical application of rules. 
Because Schweitzer does not openly follow 
Aristotle's lead, he is especially vulnerable to the charge 
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of being excessively subjective or even vacuous. I 3 He 
fails to make prominent a conception of good judgment 
in making decisions, and at least at first glance he tries 
to reduce all virtues to one: reverence for life. In doing 
so his ethics may gain inspirational force, but it loses 
the fine-tuning of Aristotelian approaches. 
In reply, we can note that the surface simplicity of 
Schweitzer's ethics belies an underlying complexity. 
He is not trying to reduce all virtues to one. Instead, 
like most virtue-ethicists, he seeks an organizing 
framework for the virtues. Ethics needs a focus in a 
central ideal of character, since "the mere giving of a 
list of virtues and duties is like striking notes at random 
on the piano and thinking it is music."(C 105) But nor 
do all virtues dissolve into one grand virtue of 
reverence for life. On the contrary, the ideal of 
reverence for life yokes together (without blurring) 
specific virtues, including forgiveness, self-control, 
tolerance, justice, and especially compassion, 
gratitude, and sincerity with oneself (honesty with and 
fidelity to oneselO. 14 
These virtues can and do conflict, creating familiar 
moral dilemmas whose resolution requires good 
judgment. Indeed, anyone of these virtues can point in 
different directions. Compassion requires supporting 
sentient life, but it can also require ending it: "In many 
ways it may happen that by slavish adherence to the 
commandment not to kill compassion is less served than 
by breaking it. When the suffering of a living creature 
cannot be alleviated, it is more ethical to end its life by 
killing it mercifully than it is to stand aloof." 15 Passages 
like this imply a conception of good moral judgment in 
exercising the virtues, even though that judgment cannot 
be neatly encapsulated in rules. 
While Schweitzer sometimes claimed that reverence 
for life is a comprehensive moral principle, in other 
places he denied. it. His theory is primarily about 
individual rather than social ethics.(C 245) Thus he 
could write: "My idea of reverence for life is not meant 
to guide the African in striving for his own and his 
nation's freedom. It is meant to get him to deal with 
more than himself in the spiritual world...."16 This is a 
revealing statement. Reverence for life implies a 
deepened respect for human rights,(C 328) but 
understanding the complex interplay of rights in 
international affairs will require an exploration of more 
specific moral principles than his ideal of reverence for 
life can provide by itself. 17 Similarly, we might think 
of reverence for life as the primary ideal for individuals 
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in morally relating themselves to life while acknow-
ledging that matters of public policy concerning the 
environment need to involve more focused rules. 
Why did Schweitzer leave so much leeway for 
individual interpretations in applying the ideal of 
reverence for life? Although he claims to have 
uncovered the ultimate foundation for ethics, we can 
view him as responding to the needs of a particUlar 
time-though a time not altogether unlike our own. 
Writing in the aftermath ofWorld War I, he saw a crisis 
in Western civilization. The crisis was manifested in 
the devaluation of human life btn rooted in the forces 
of mass society. Most people, he charged, are "lost in 
the mass" and prevented from working out their own 
convictions, whether due to overwork, overspeciali-
zation, or control by governments, corporations, and 
churches.(C 17) To counterbalance these forces, each 
of us must engage in personal reflection on moral values 
and respect the similar efforts of others. Accordingly, 
an adequate ethics must be flexible, open, and tolerant. 
It will be individualistic and overcome traditional 
ethicists' "downright fear of what cannot be subjected 
to rules and regulations."(C 291) A creative ethics of 
altruism will have a "fluid indefiniteness" that embraces 
innumerable avenues for caring.(C 166, 320) 
This spirit of flexibility is attractive, but can an 
environmental ethic reasonably forgo all rankings of 
life forms? I do not see how. Perhaps we should heed 
Schweitzer's advice to avoid abstract cosmological 
rankings, but we do and must implicitly use rankings 
when we make decisions about the differential treatment 
of species in cases of conflicting interests. Indeed, 
Schweitzer himself sometimes implies there are good 
reasons for valuing organisms differentially according 
to the forms oflife possible for them. He clearly implies 
that sentient creatures have a moral status unlike that 
of plants and nonsentient animals. He devotes special 
attention to arguing against killing sentient creatures 
for pleasure: bull fighting, cock fighting, and hunting 
for sport. I8 And he in veighs against misuse of sentient 
animals in medical experiments and in teaching science. 
No similar pronouncements are made about experiments 
on plants. Even if we avoid saying sentient animals have 
greater inherent worth than other animals, clearly the 
implication is that sentient animals make special claiins 
on us (as do humans). 
Does Schweitzer's ethical theory leave any room 
for making the rankings he disavows? Retum to the 
frrst premise in the will-to-live argument: "I am life 
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which wills to live, in the midst of life which wills to 
live." Even if we grant that the most basic fonn of self-
affinnation is afflnnation of our willeto-live, and even 
if we agree that at this level we share a kinship with all 
life, we also discover dissimilarities between our will 
LOdive and other organisms once we turn from 
introspection to inspection of the world. Depending on 
the organism, the dissimilarities will be striking (as 
with plants and lower animals) or less striking (as with 
higher mammals). Rarely will they justify eradication 
of a species (as with the polio and AIDS viruses), but 
they will justify the'commonsense conviction that 
humans have greater inherent worth than algae. They 
will also justify cherishing chimpanzees more highly 
than chiton, because oftlle former's more sophisticated 
mental and social life. 
Does reverence for life permit eating sentient 
animals or does it require vegetarianism? The refusal 
to make differential judgments about life fonns prevents 
us from grasping this question as urgent in the way that 
Schweitzer himself did toward the end of his life.19 If 
cows and cabbage are equally sacred, why should eating 
the one raise greater moral qualms than eating the other? 
Once we recognize moral differences between sentient 
and nonsentient life, especially as we attend to the 
suffering inflicted on sentient creatures in modem meat 
production, the issue becomes important within an 
ethics of reverence for life, even though that etilic does 
not by itself settle the issue. . 
Also consider Schweitzer's conduct. He helped a 
wounded osprey by choosing to kill. fish to feed it. 
Although he insisted that such choices are arbitrary, 
most of us see a good reason in the unique features of 
the osprey and in its rarity, compared to the abundance 
offish. We justify special efforts to preserVe endangered 
species, rather than treating each living organism as on 
a par with every other. Even if we share Schweitzer's 
hesitation to make abstract rankings of life forms, we 
can understand his stories about saving one animal by 
sacrificing others as parables of good judgment in 
"necessary" killing. 
What, after all, is necessary killing? Schweitzer 
suggests we can kill nonhuman life 
a. in self-defense, 
b. as an inevitable part of legitimate activities, such 
as when we crush microorganisms by going for a 
walk, and 
c. in order to save human lives, as when a physician 
kills dangerous microorganisms.(C 316) 
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These pronouncements qualify as moral rules, however 
rough.2o As such they call for justification, presumably 
in tenns of the greater value of a human life compared 
with dangerous microorganisms. 
Rethought along these lines, Schweitzer's ideal of 
reverence for life remains somewhat vague (or 
creatively open), but hardly vacuous. After setting aside 
his metaphysics, we can maintain the spirit of flexibility 
and personal discretion in his ethics while taking into 
account the fonns of life possible for them. Schweitzer 
repeatedly insisted that we must stop killing thought-
lessly, that we must think before we kill. He should 
have insisted that we think well, that we exercise good 
moral judgment-but he implied as much. 
IV. Responsibility (without Guilt Mongering) 
Contemporary ethics is preoccupied with complex 
moral dilemmas. Schweitzer, by contrast, was pre-
occupied with motivation and with finding an ethics 
that inspires moral commitrnwt and enthusiasm.(C 299) 
Reverence for life is an ideal of character that 
"penetrates unceasingly and in all directions a man's 
observation, reflection, and resolutions" in devotion to 
life.(C 316) It is absolute in the sense that it can never be 
fully achieved, given that to be alive is to participate in 
some killing.(L 232) Yet that very absoluteness evokes a 
higher moral pitch in everyday emotion and conduct. 
This emphasis on high moral aspiration was 
distorted by his occasional preoccupation with guilt. I 
am guilty, he says, each time I kill any living thing, no 
matter what my motive: "Whenever I in any way 
sacrifice or injure life, I am not within the sphere of the 
ethical, but I become guilty, whether it be egoistically 
guilty for the sake of maintaining my own existence or 
welfare, or unegoistically guilty for the sake of 
maintaining a greater number of other existences or their 
welfare."(C 325) For Schweitzer, then, "necessary" 
killing does not mean justified killing. Nor does it mean 
killing which is wrong but excusable, so as remove guilt. 
To kill is to be culpable. We are "murderers" when we 
kill a mosquito and "mass murderers" when we kill 
bacteria.(C 316-7) 
These are extraordinary claims! Admittedly, they 
have a certain authenticity insofar as they flow from 
Schweitzer's metaphysics.21 If each organism is 
sa{''fed, then killing it is tantamount to desecrating the 
sacred, rendering one guilty. But consistency is one 
thing; cogency is another. Schweitzer's metaphysics is 
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a recipe for guilt mongering, which is my final reason 
for setting it aside. 
Does setting the metaphysics aside diminish the high 
demands contained in reverence for life? There is some 
danger, of course, that the demands may be too great. 
Schweitzer placed enormous pressure on himself and 
seemed to find his feelings of guilt a helpful source of 
motivation.22 Most people, however, would be crushed 
by comparable feelings of guilt. 
Surely we can respond to a call for greater 
responsibility for life without being drawn into 
excessive guilt. In its core meaning, responsibility 
means trying to act responsibly and being morally 
accountable, that is, susceptible to being called to 
account for our conduct in terms of good moral 
reasons.23 When those reasons are sound and sufficient. 
killing is justified and (at least often) no guilt is 
involved. In particular, there is no guilt-none 
whatsoever-when a physician like Schweitzer killed 
bacteria by sterilizing surgery instruments or when 
patients take antibiotics. Nor is there guilt when we eat 
vegetables and nonsentient animals (leaving aside the 
controversy over eating sentient animals). 
That does not mean we should never feel bad when 
we justifiably participate in killing. Regret is often 
appropriate. Regret is the appropriate emotion when we 
reasonably wish we did not have to take life, by contrast 
with guilt for unjustified killing. Regret can be mild or 
intense, and it can be accompanied by strong feelings 
of sadness, grief, and even horror. (Think of euthanizing 
a beloved pet whose suffering from cancer can no longer 
be lessened in other ways.) In addition to being focused 
on specific acts of killing, regret can be a general 
response to our immersion in the cycle of killing. 
Ifwe reassert common sense in justifying "necessary" 
killing, have we abandoned the spirit of reverence for 
life? Surely not. Reverence for life includes reverence 
for our own lives, as manifested in justifiable self-
defense. Understandably and admirably, Schweitzer 
wanted to avoid an ethic ofexpediency in which human 
concerns automatically override the interests of other 
life forms. But in doing so he established a misleading 
dichotomy between "ethical and necessary," such that 
taking life is unethical even when necessary to protect 
other life.(C 325) This dichotomy is inconsistent with 
his own insistence that the ethical includes reverence 
for oneself as manifested in self-defense and self-
development. It is also inconsistent with his belief that 
devotion to other life sometimes requires killing for its 
Belween the Species 212 
sake. To be consistent, Schweitzer should say that the 
ethical includes necessary killing, not contrasts with it. 
To conclude, Schweitzer's metaphysical vision 
contributed to the boldness with which he set forth a 
biocentric ethics over half a century before most 
philosophp.rs began to struggle with his issues. That 
metaphysics distorts some of his central ideas, yet the 
key elements in his ethics survive intact after his 
metaphysics is set aside. Those elements include unity 
of life, empathy for other living organisms based on 
shared instincts, a flexible virtue-guided perspective 
focused in a (complex) ideal of reverence for life, and 
responsible commitment to furthering life while being 
sensitive to differences among life forms.24 
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